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In his opinion in Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Au-
thority, I Lord Scarman of the English 2 House of Lords remarked that
"women have obtained by the availability of the pill a choice of life-
style with a degree of independence and of opportunity undreamed
of until this generation .... ." He went on to caution wisely that the
"law ignores these developments at its peril . . . .- 4 While this is
indeed enlightened prose, courts in both the United Kingdom and
the United States have been far less rational when faced with the
issue of contraceptive services for minors.
5
Some indication of the number of minors wishing to use methods
of birth control is given by statistics of those actually receiving pre-
scription contraceptives. 6 In the U.S. in 1983, 1.6 million patients
under the age of twenty were served by family planning clinics, and
almost as many teenagers obtained family planning services from
private physicians. 7 Similar figures for England in 1984 report that
1. Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, [1985] 3 All E.R. 402
(H.L.).
2. The general practice of those who write about courts in Britain is to use "English
law" to refer to the judicial system of England and Wales, leaving out Scotland and
Northern Ireland which are largely separate.
3. Gillick at 419.
4. Id.
5. In the literature, the term "minor" is generally used interchangeably with
"youth," "adolescents" and "children." The difference, however, is sometimes signifi-
cant because, as Professor Wald points out, "semantic differences may reflect real differ-
ences in how we perceive young people depending on the issue under consideration."
Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 255, 265 n.42
(1979).
6. Prescription contraceptives include oral contraceptives ("the pill"), intrauterine
devices ("IUDs") and diaphragms. An American study shows that in 1982 73% of teen-
age women using contraceptives relied on these methods of contraception as opposed to
non-prescription methods such as condoms and spermicidal foams and creams; of these,
90% used the pill. I RISKING THE FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY, PREGNANCY, AND
CHILDBEARING 154 (C.D. Hayes ed. 1987) [hereinafter RISKING THE FUTURE].
7. Id. Forty-three percent of the teenage clinic patients were under the age of 18. Id.
It has also been reported that:
By age 20, most unmarried young men and women are sexually active: over 80
percent of males and over 70 percent of females report that they have had inter-
course at least once .... While only 5 percent of teenage girls and 17 percent of
teenage boys report having had intercourse by their fifteenth birthday, 44 percent
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17,000 minors under age sixteen were taking the pill.8 Although
these statistics do not indicate the use of non-prescription contra-
ceptives, studies show that only about 60 percent of American teen-
agers and 90 percent of English teenagers who are sexually active
use any contraceptive method with regularity.9 These figures are
reflected in the teenage pregnancy rates for both countries.' 0
On either side of the Atlantic the courts' involvement in the issue
of minors' access to contraceptives has come about through debate
over whether minors' access to prescription contraceptives should
be made conditional on parental consent" or notification.' 2 The
main rationale for a consent or notification requirement is that some
minors lack the maturity necessary to make rational decisions, and
of girls and 64 percent of boys report that they were sexually active by their eight-
eenth birthday.
Id. at 41-42.
8. The Times (London), Oct. 18, 1985, at 15, col. 2.
9. RISKING THE FUTURE, supra note 6, at 46; Jones, Forrest, Goldman, Henshaw, Lin-
coln, Rosoff, Westoff & Wulf, Teenage Pregnancy in Developed Countries: Determinants and
Policy Implications, 17 FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 53, 57 (1985). The U.S. and U.K. figures
given are for 1982 and 1976 respectively.
10. The National Center for Health Statistics predicts that there will be 1.1 million
unintended pregnancies among teenagers in 1986. In 1983, the number of births to
teens under 20 was just under half a million (499,038), accounting for almost 14% of all
births. SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., RE-
PORT ON TEEN PREGNANCY: WHAT IS BEING DONE? A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK (COMM. PRINT
1985) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT ON TEEN PREGNANCY]. See also RISKING THE Fu-
TURE, supra note 6, at 5 (it is estimated that 43% of all adolescent girls regardless of
marital status will become pregnant at least once before their twentieth birthday); ALAN
GUTrMACHER INSTITUTE, 1 1 MILLION TEENAGERS: WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THE EPI-
DEMIC OF ADOLESCENT PREGNANCIES IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1976) ("Each year, more
than one million 15-19-year-olds become pregnant, one tenth of all women in this age
group. [Two-thirds of these pregnancies are conceived out of wedlock.] In addition,
some 30,000 girls younger than 15 get pregnant annually.")
In the U.K. in 1984, 10,000 minors less than sixteen years old became pregnant. The
Times (London), Oct. 18, 1985, at 15, col. 4. In 1981, 4.41% of girls aged between 15
and 19 inclusive had a pregnancy [birth rate plus abortion rate]. This should be com-
pared with the equivalent figure of 6.36% in 1971, before birth control became widely
available.
11. "Parent" is used to include guardians and those acting in the place of parents.
12. The distinction between a consent requirement and a notification requirement is
important in theory, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in considering parental involve-
ment in abortion decisions. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979). A consent re-
quirement can amount to a parental veto whereas notification seems to recognize the
minor's autonomy. In reality, however, the difference is much less significant because
any parental involvement is sufficient to deter many minors from seeking contraceptives
out of fear that their parents will learn that they are sexually active. See Alan Guttmacher
Institute, lWhat Government Can Do About Teenage Pregnancy, 4:2 PUBLIC POL'Y ISSUES IN
BRIEF, Mar. 1984, at 1, 3. See also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah [PPAU] v. Mathe-
son, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 (D. Utah 1983) ("Although the Supreme Court has not
confronted the issue directly, it is clear that the rule applicable to parental consent laws
also applies to parental notification laws"). This comment will therefore often use "con-
sent" to include both notification and consent.
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that parental decisionmaking should therefore be substituted for the
judgment of these minors. The difficulty of determining the matur-
ity of a minor with certainty has led to the framing of parental con-
sent requirements in terms of chronological age, using age as a
surrogate for maturity.
Given the necessity of striking a balance between individual lib-
erty and the protection of those minors who are unable to make
rational decisions, the judiciaries of both the U.S. and the U.K. have
been rightly troubled by the mismatch between age and maturity,
recognizing that in fact some presumptively immature minors are
able to make well-founded independent decisions. An inclination
toward self-determination has led the courts to respond to the over-
inclusiveness of the age-based method of classification by providing
some means whereby a minor can demonstrate her ability to make
an independent decision regarding the use of contraceptives. In
their preoccupation with ensuring rational decisionmaking, how-
ever, both judicial systems have overlooked for the most part the
more pressing social problem of the alarmingly high rates of teen-
age pregnancy. In order to address the problem of teenage preg-
nancy while providing for the best interests of minors and the wider
society, courts in the U.S. and U.K. should ensure that all sexually
active minors have access to prescription contraceptives on their
own consent.
I. Minors'Access to Prescription Contraceptives
A. The United States Position
1. Federal Statutes
The federal government exerts an influence on minors' access to
contraceptives through its funding provisions for family planning
services. These provisions are located in four separate programs
administered by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS). Three of the programs were set up by the Social Security
Act.' 3 The federal standards provide that none of these is restricted
as to age, and consequently a Utah law that attempted to impose a
parental consent requirement for the receipt of such services by mi-
nors was held unenforceable.' 4
13. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Maternal and Child Health Services
Block Grant), § 1396 et seq. (Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs), § 1397 et
seq. (Block Grants to States for Social Services) (1982).
14. T.H. v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873 (D. Utah 1975).
214
Vol. 5:212, 1986
Minor Access to Contraceptives
The fourth and most important of the federal programs is Title X
of the Public Health Service Act, added in 1970 to establish a system
of federally funded public and non-profit family planning projects.15
Again, the accompanying federal regulations specifically required
that these services must be provided without regard to age.' 6 Con-
sequently, when HHS promulgated regulations requiring federally
funded family planning clinics to notify the parents of minors to
whom contraceptive care was provided, two district courts held
them invalid.' 7 In December 1985, however, the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee agreed to allow Title X funds to be
used by Utah's health department, despite a Utah statute requiring
prior written parental consent before minors may receive publicly
funded family planning services.'
8
15. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) el seq. (1982). In 1978, § 1001(a) of Title X of the Public
Health Service Act was amended to include coverage for "services for adolescents."
Pub. L. No. 95-613, 92 Stat. 3093 (1978). This amendment was a response to the con-
cern that "the problems of teenage pregnancy have become critical." H.R. REP. No.
1191, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1978). Three years later, § 1001(a) was amended again,
to include a provision encouraging family participation in funded programs. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 570 (1981). Section
1001(a), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 300(a) (1982), now reads:
The Secretary is authorized to make grants to and enter into contracts with public
or nonprofit private entities to assist in the establishment and operation of volun-
tary family planning projects which shall offer a broad range of acceptable and effec-
tive family planning methods and services (including natural family planning
methods, infertility services, and services for adolescents). To the extent practical,
entities which receive grants or contracts under this subsection shall encourage fam-
ily participation in projects assisted under this subsection.
16. Project Grants for Family Planning Services, 42 C.F.R. § 59.5 (1985) reads, in
relevant part:
What requirements must be met by a family planning project?
(a) Each project supported under this part must:
(4) Provide services without regard to religion, race, color, national origin, handi-
capping condition, age, sex, number of pregnancies, or marital status.
17. New York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983) (purporting to enjoin en-
forcement of the regulation throughout the U.S.); Planned Parenthood Federation of
America v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The proposed regulations, intended
to be effective in February of 1983, required such clinics to notify an unemancipated
minor's parent or guardian within 10 days after the contraceptives were initially pre-
scribed. Notification was to take place by certified mail, return receipt requested, and if
notification could not be verified, prescription contraceptives could not be provided to
the minor on a subsequent occasion. There were provisions for notice to be waived
when it was probable that the parent would inflict "substantial" harm on the minor and
in cases of treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. Also, state laws that were stricter
than the federal standard would have to be followed, while those authorizing minors to
obtain care on their own consent were to be overridden. Finally, fees for services were
to be based on the parents' income rather than the minor's. See 4.2 PUBLIC PoL'Y IsSUES
IN BRIEF, Mar. 1984, at 3; see also Doe v. Pickett, 480 F. Supp. 1218, 1220-21 (S.D.W.Va.
1979) (West Virginia's attempt to require parental consent constituted imposition of an
additional eligibility requirement and clearly thwarted goals of Title X).
18. This has become known as the "Utah Compromise" because it was insisted upon
by Senator Hatch, the Chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee,
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2. State Policies
Where the states are not preempted by federal statutes,' 9 the abil-
ity of a minor to obtain contraceptives is sometimes governed by the
general rule that the age at which one can give effective consent to
medical treatment is the age of majority, now eighteen in most
states.20 In many states, however, this rule has been almost swal-
lowed by exceptions. 21 Some states have lowered the age of consent
to medical treatment in general by statute22 or have overridden it by
legislative or judicial recognition of exceptions in cases of emer-
gency 23 or in cases involving emancipated 24 or mature minors. 2 5
With regard to contraceptive services specifically, some state leg-
islatures have affirmed the right of all minors to receive such serv-
ices on their own consent.2 6 Other states have statutes providing
as a condition of reauthorization of the Title X program to fiscal 1989. The Committee
agreed to authorize the Department of Health and Human Services to spend up to
$600,000 in each of the next four years on a special "demonstration" project in Utah to
"test" the impact of the parental consent requirement. WASHINGTON MEMO: A PUBLICA-
TION OF THE ALAN GUTTMACHER INSITUTE, May 15, 1986 (W-7).
19. The rules against preemption by the federal law are stronger in the area of fam-
ily law. See PPAU v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 n.3.
20. Most states reduced the age of majority from 21 to 18 in 1971 after the enact-
ment of the 26th amendment to the Constitution giving 18-year-olds the right to vote in
federal elections. The exceptions are Alabama (19); Colorado (21); Mississippi (21);
Nebraska (19); Pennsylvania (21) and Wyoming (19).
21. For a comprehensive table of relevant state laws see J. MORRISSEY, A. HOFMANN
& J. THROPE, CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS: A LEGAL GUIDE app. at 149-250 (1986).
22. For example, Alabama (14); Kansas (18 in general but 16 if the parents are not
immediately available); Louisiana (any minor "who believes himself to be afflicted with
an illness or disease"); Oregon (15); and South Carolina (16).
23. While some states have expanded the definition of a medical emergency to in-
clude an immediate danger to the life, health or mental well-being of a minor, for exam-
ple, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH L. § 2504(4) (Consol. 1976 & Supp. 1985), it is unlikely that
contraceptive services will be considered emergency treatment.
24. The conditions under which a minor will be recognized as emancipated vary ac-
cording to state statutes but generally include marriage, living away from home, being
self-supporting or being in military service.
25. In Nevada the consent of the parent is not necessary to treat a minor who "un-
derstands the nature and purpose of the proposed examination or treatment and its
probable outcome, and voluntarily requests it." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129.030(2)
(1986). An Idaho statute provides that -[a]ny person of ordinary intelligence and
awareness sufficient for him or her generally to comprehend the need for, the nature of,
and the significant risks" inherent in any medical treatment is competent to consent on
his or her own behalf. IDAHO CODE § 39-4302 (1985 & Supp. 1986). The crucial criteria
in mature minor rulings appear to be that: 1) the treatment was for the benefit of the
minor rather than a third party; 2) the minor was near the age of majority, or at least 15,
and was considered to have sufficient mental capacity to understand fully the nature and
importance of the medical steps proposed; and 3) the medical procedure was not 'major'
or 'serious.' A.R. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 146
(1977).
26. Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3104 (1976 & Supp. 1986); California, CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 14503 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT.
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that minors may give consent for contraceptive services but only if
they fall within certain statutory categories, such as married minors
or those who, in the opinion of the physician, would suffer a health
hazard if services were not provided.27 Even in states where a minor
may give effective consent, the applicable statute may permit paren-
tal notification by the provider. 28 Also, in many of the states where
minors are not explicitly given the right to consent by statute, there
is a de facto parental consent requirement since clinics and other
services, especially private ones, have considerable discretion in set-
ting office policy.
29
§ 25-6-102 (1973 & Supp. 1986); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2(a)(5) (1985 & Supp.
1986); Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.185 (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1986); Maryland,
MD. HEALTH-GEN. (1982) CODE ANN. § 20-102 (1982 & Supp. 1986); New Mexico, N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-8-3, 24-8-5 (1978 & Supp. 1986); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-21.5 (1985); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 109.640 (1985) (15 and over only); South
Carolina (no specific statute but the Attorney General has stated that minors aged 16
and over are authorized to procure birth control without the consent of their parents or
other persons, 1971-72 Op. Att'y Gen. 213); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-34-
104, 68-34-107 (1983 & Supp. 1986); and Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.2(D)(2)
(1950 & Supp. 1986).
27. Florida (maternal health and contraceptive information and services of a non-
surgical nature may be provided to a minor who is married, or a parent, or pregnant, or
who has parental consent, or who may, in the opinion of the physician, suffer probable
health hazards if such services are not provided), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.382(5)(a)
(1986); Idaho (examinations, prescriptions, devices and informational materials regard-
ing the prevention of contraception may be provided to any person who, in the good
faith judgment of the physician, is sufficiently intelligent and mature to understand the
nature and significance thereof), IDAHO CODE § 18-603 (1979 & Supp. 1986); Illinois
(consent of the parent is required unless the minor is married, or a parent, or pregnant,
or a serious health hazard would be created without such services, or the minor is re-
ferred by a physician, clergyman, or a planned parenthood agency), ILL. STAT. ANN. ch.
111 1/2 para. 4651 (Smith-Hurd 1963 & Supp. 1986); Maine (parental consent is re-
quired unless the minor is a parent or married, or may suffer in the professional judg-
ment of a physician probable health hazards if such services are not provided), ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1908 (1964 & Supp. 1986); and Mississippi (contraceptives may be
furnished to any minor who is a parent, or who is married, or who has the consent of his
or her parent or legal guardian, or who has been referred by another physician, a clergy-
man, family planning clinic, school or state agency), Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-42-7 (1972 &
Supp. 1986).
28. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 577A-2, 3 (1976 & Supp. 1984); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 20-102(e) (1982 & Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.4(b) (1985) (noti-
fication to parents is allowed when essential to the life or health of the minor); and OR.
REV. STAT. § 109.650 (1985). The comparable Utah statute, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-
325, 76-7-321 (1953 & Supp. 1986), was held unconstitutional in PPAU v. Matheson,
582 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Utah 1983) because it failed to provide a procedure whereby a
mature minor or a minor who could demonstrate that his or her best interests were
contrary to parental notification could obtain contraceptives confidentially. Another
questionable statute is Kansas' statute which only permits state-established family plan-
ning centers to provide contraceptives if the patient is over 18 and is married or has
been referred to the center by a person licensed to practice medicine. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-501 (1964 & Supp. 1985).
29. A national sample found that only 59% of general and family practitioners would
provide contraceptives to minors without parental consent. Orr & Forrest, The .4vailabil-
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3. Judicial Decisions
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the use of contraceptives
by adults is constitutionally protected as part of the fundamental
right to make decisions on matters of child-bearing. 30 The right of
minors to obtain nonprescription contraceptives was established by
the Supreme Court in Carey v. Population Services International.3 1
However, because the Court did not consider either parental con-
sent requirements or prescription contraceptives, the constitutional-
ity of requiring parental involvement in the decisions of minors to
obtain prescription contraceptives was left unclear.3 2
A number of subsequent cases about parental consent require-
ments, none of which ever reached the Supreme Court, seem to be
somewhat less permissive than Carey v. Population Services International
in their treatment of minors.33 In Doe v. Irwin, for example, al-
though the court held that notifying parents of the distribution of
contraceptive devices and medication to unemancipated minors was
not constitutionally required, its decision did not rule out the possi-
bility that mandating such notice could be constitutionally
permitted.
34
The abortion decisions of the Supreme Court provide more gui-
dance on states' ability to require parental involvement in minors'
ity of Reproductive Health Services From U.S. Private Physicians, 17:2 FAMILY PLANNING PERSP.
63 (1985).
30. The first judicial recognition of such protection was in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Connecticut statute making the use of contraceptives by married
couples unlawful was held unconstitutional). The zone of privacy established in Griswold
was held to encompass unmarried as well as married couples in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972). The implications of this right to privacy were clarified in Carey, v. Popu-
lation Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), where the court held that, as to adults, restric-
tions on the distribution of contraceptives had to be justified by a compelling state
interest and that the laws must be narrowly drawn to cover only the expressed state
interests.
31. Justice Brennan's opinion for the court concluded that a New York statute mak-
ing it a crime for anyone to sell or distribute contraceptives to those under 16 was un-
constitutional because it imposed significant burdens on an individual right to use
contraceptives while serving no compelling state interest. 431 U.S. 678, 696.
32. This issue was not before the Court because the state of New York had conceded
that physicians were not covered by the law in question and could prescribe such contra-
ceptives for minors of any age. 431 U.S. at 697-98.
33. See, e.g., Jane Does v. Utah Dep't of Health, 776 F.2d 253, 256 (10th Cir. 1985)
(Title X, though precluding states from imposing parental consent requirements, leaves
Utah free to apply its own consent requirements in the use of its own funds); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 710, 720-21 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (referral
procedure might allow Utah to impose its own consent requirements while still receiving
federal funds); Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1169 (6th Cir. 1980) ("[I]t is clearly a mat-
ter for the state to determine whether a notice requirement is necessary or desirable to
achieve the purpose for which the [Tri-County Family Planning Center] was
established").
34. 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980).
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decisions to obtain contraceptives. Following Roe v. Wade35 many
states passed statutes establishing a parental consent requirement
before a minor could obtain an abortion. The Supreme Court re-
sponded to such legislation by ruling that parental consent may not
be required in the case of emancipated or mature minors and that
the statutes must provide a "judicial bypass" allowing the pregnant
minor to go before the courts to petition forjudicial authorization in
place of parental consent. 36 To obtain such authorization, the mi-
nor must show either that she is mature enough to make the deci-
sion herself or, if the judge finds that she is not mature, that an
abortion would be in her best interests. 37 The district court relied
on these cases in Planned Parenthood Association of Utah v. Matheson,
where a Utah statute requiring parental notification prior to the pro-
vision of prescription or nonprescription contraceptives to an un-
married minor was held to be not only preempted by Title X but
also unconstitutionally overbroad because it failed to distinguish be-
tween immature minors and other mature minors or immature mi-
nors who could demonstrate that parental notification was not in
their best interests. 38 Thus it seems that a state "may not impose a
blanket parental notification requirement on minors seeking to ex-
ercise their constitutionally protected right to decide whether to
bear or beget a child by using contraceptives." 39 However, the
trend of equating birth control decisions with abortion decisions in
recent contraceptive access cases40 suggests, despite language to the
contrary,4' that a parental consent or notification provision might
be constitutional if the state provided a judicial bypass similar to
that required in the abortion cases.
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979). It is also clear that parental notifi-
cation requirements may not be imposed on mature or emancipated minors. H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 406 (1981). While the courts have not yet resolved the issue of
whether parental notification statutes must provide a judicial bypass similar to consent
statutes, PPAU v. Matheson at 1009 suggests such an approach.
37. For an account of how minors demonstrate that an abortion is in their best inter-
ests, see Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek Court-Authorized
Abortions, 15 FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 259 (1983).
38. PPAU v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001.
39. 582 F. Supp. at 1009. See also Jane Does v. Utah Dep't of Health, 776 F.2d 253
(1985).
40. See, e.g., Jane Does v. Utah Dep't of Health, 776 F.2d 253, 256 (1985), where the
court cited an abortion decision in support of an assertion, in dicta, that a requirement
of mandatory parental consent for provision of contraceptive services to minors was of
dubious constitutionality. The fact that the case cited was an abortion decision was not
mentioned.
41. For example, in Matheson the court noted in dicta that it did "not intend to imply
... that a law which provided a means for the minor to demonstrate maturity or best
interest contrary to parental involvement would be constitutional." 582 F. Supp at 1009
n.9.
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B. The United Kingdom Position
Although the age of majority in Britain is eighteen, 42 the Family
Law Reform Act of 1969 establishes that a minor who has attained
the age of sixteen may consent to any "surgical, medical, or dental
treatment."-43 Where minors under sixteen are concerned, the Act
merely says that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as
making ineffective any consent which would have been effective if
this section had not been enacted," and thereby preserves any other
existing right to consent including any provided by the common
law. 44 Since the common law itself is unclear, the ability of minors
under sixteen to consent to medical treatment is not determined by
the Act.
The issue of the ability of a minor under sixteen to obtain contra-
ceptives eventually came before the House of Lords in Gillick v. Wis-
bech Area Health Authority, in October 1985. The Department of
Health and Social Security's (DHSS) guidance to Local Area Health
Authorities, 45 contained in a circular issued in December 1980,
stated that where a person under sixteen asked for contraceptive ad-
vice and services the doctor or other professional should urge the
minor to involve her parents or guardians, but that in exceptional
cases it was up to the physician to decide whether to provide treat-
ment without parental consent.46 This guidance was challenged by
Mrs. Gillick, the mother of five daughters under the age of sixteen,
who sought declarations against her Area Health Authority and the
DHSS that the ability to provide contraceptive advice and services
without parental consent unlawfully and adversely affected the wel-
fare of her daughters and her own parental rights. The majority of
the Lords, having found that there were no statutory provisions that
determined their decision, ruled that subject to certain conditions,
physicians may legally provide contraceptive counseling and serv-
ices to minors younger than sixteen without obtaining parental con-
42. Family Law Reform Act, 1969, ch. 46, § 1.
43. Family Law Reform Act, 1969, ch. 46, § 8(1).
44. Family Law Reform Act, 1969, ch. 46, § 8(3).
45. Health Service Notice HN (80) 45. Local Area Health Authorities in the U.K. are
responsible for family planning clinics which provide much of the contraceptive treat-
ment in Britain.
46. The exceptional cases cover situations where "the involvement of the parent
might dissuade the girl from seeking professional advice at all and, therefore, expose her
to the immediate risks of pregnancy and of sexually-transmitted diseases, as well as
other long-term physical, psychological and emotional consequences"; where the girl's
parents are "unconcerned, entirely unresponsive, or grossly disturbed"; and where the
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sent. 4 7 The conditions, found in Lord Fraser's judgment,48 are
somewhat more specific than the guidelines provided by the DHSS
and stipulate that the doctor may proceed:
without the parents' consent or even knowledge provided that he is
satisfied on the following matters: (1) that the girl (although under
sixteen years of age) will understand his advice; (2) that he cannot per-
suade her to inform her parents or to allow him to inform the parents
that she is seeking contraceptive advice; (3) that she is very likely to
begin or to continue having sexual intercourse with or without contra-
ceptive treatment; (4) that unless she receives contraceptive advice or
treatment her physical or mental health or both are likely to suffer;
(5) that her best interests require him to give her contraceptive advice,
treatment or both without the parental consent.49
II. The Courts' Concerns: A Critique
In the U.S. and the U.K. the only general restriction on a woman's
access to contraceptive services is that some such services must be
prescribed by a doctor. 50 Since adults, therefore, are largely able to
make their own decisions about the use of contraceptives, the obvi-
ous starting point of the inquiry is to question why minors should be
treated any differently. In a political system which attempts to bal-
ance individual liberty with protection of minors unable to make de-
cisions for themselves, it seems appropriate to demand a coherent,
principled justification for giving any third person a veto over a mi-
nor's decision, especially where that decision primarily concerns the
minor's own body. Indeed, the U.S. courts have clearly attempted
to formulate such a justification in parental consent and notification
cases, 51 first identifying the general position and then seeking "a
47. Fraser, Scarman and Bridge, LL.J., with Brandon and Templeman, LL.J., dis-
senting. Lord Fraser considered and rejected as unhelpful the Family Law Reform Act,
1969, ch. 46, § 8; the Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 131; and the Education Act,
1944, ch. 31, § 48. The Lords' decision overruled the Court of Appeal, [1985] 1 All E.R.
533 (C.A.), which had in turn overruled the trial court, [1984] Q.B. 581.
48. Gillick at 413.
49. In the wake of Gillick, it was suggested that the English Parliament should intro-
duce legislation to make 16 the minimum age of consent for contraceptive services. For
example, the headline in The Guardian for Feb. 3, 1983, was "Thatcher backs U-turn on
under-16 pill". However, it remains to be seen whether the legislature will act on these
suggestions.
50. In America there are also financial restrictions, although the four federal pro-
grams funding family planning services should ensure that no patient will be denied
services because of an inability to pay. See supra notes 13, 15.
In Britain, family planning services were incorporated into the National Health Ser-
vice in 1973 and made available free of charge.
51. PPAU v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001 passim; Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 passim.
These cases were settled on questions of statutory interpretation. The constitutional
issues, therefore, were never reached.
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significant state interest .. . that is not present in the case of the
adult" 52 to justify the greater burden on the privacy of minors. The
House of Lords has done likewise, albeit in a less structured fashion.
Historically in both the U.S. and the U.K., the main reason offered
for subjecting a minor's decision to a parental consent requirement
was the common law's judgment that because minors in general lack
full capacity to act in certain matters, they should bear a legal disa-
bility as protection against their improvidence and immature judg-
ment as well as against the possibility that they might be exploited
by others. 53 In addition, it was traditionally the role of the minor's
parents to compensate for this incapacity and to give consent on
behalf of the minor because parents were assumed to be most likely
to act in the best interests of their children.
54
This traditional analysis has been used in recent court decisions
concerning minors' access to contraceptives. These concerns, how-
ever, are nowadays perhaps more familiar as issues of informed con-
sent because they have been subsumed by the requirement that a
patient must be permitted to exercise a meaningful choice regarding
proposed treatment and, therefore, must possess a certain level of
understanding. 55 As a result of this historical influence both the
U.S. and U.K. court systems have approached the contraceptive
question primarily with the goal of ensuring a rational decisionmak-
ing process. For example, the U.S. courts have accepted the Dan-
forth ruling 56 that states have a broader authority to regulate the
conduct of children than that of adults because children are not pos-
sessed of full capacity for individual choice. Similarly, the U.K.
courts seem to have accepted the lack of capacity as the main reason
for substituting parental consent for the minor's and have framed
their decisions in terms of the understanding and intelligence of the
child.
57
52. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1978).
53. See Wald, supra note 5, at 256-66.
54. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the family
rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience
and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important,
historically it has been recognized that natural bonds of love and affection lead parents
to act in the best interests of their children")
55. See, e.g., J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
56. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1978), cited in PPAU v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001,
1007-08 and Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1166. In Daforth the court refers at 74-75 to
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) and Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 649-50 (1968) as support for this proposition.
57. See Gillick at 421 ("The principle is that the parental right of power and control
over the person and property of his child exists primarily to enable the parent to dis-
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Given the premise that the justification for the differential treat-
ment of minors is their lack of maturity, policymakers could have
decided either that legal capacity should follow actual capacity on a
case-by-case basis or that some easily measurable proxy for maturity
should be adopted. Where parental consent requirements are in-
volved the latter approach has generally been followed, using
chronological age to draw a bright line between those legally pre-
sumed to have the capacity to consent and those who lack the requi-
site maturity and therefore require the substitution of parental
consent. Thus the age of majority, or in the U.K. the age of sixteen,
has been used to define a group to be accorded special attention.
Although age is no doubt related to maturity, a difficulty arises
when one attempts to determine the maturity of a particular individ-
ual at a certain age from the average level of maturity at that age
because different individuals mature at different rates. This prob-
lem is particularly marked during adolescence, when maturity varies
widely between individuals depending on physiological changes and
life experiences. Parental consent laws based on chronological age
are, therefore, arguably underinclusive because they do not include
some individuals who, though meeting the age requirement, have
yet to develop the necessary maturity, and overinclusive because
they do not allow an individual who matures precociously to make
such a decision despite her capacity to do so. 58
Recognizing that many classifications suffer from a similar lack of
fit, 59 the U.S. courts have developed the so-called "rational basis"
test under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
in order to determine the bounds of reasonable classification. The
courts also employ heightened scrutiny where the classification in-
charge his duty of maintenance, protection and education until he reaches such an age
as to be able to look after himself and make his own decisions").
58. See, e.g., Scarman, LJ's opinion in Gillick, at 425: "social experience . . . is that
many girls are fully able to make sensible decisions about many matters before they
reach the age of 16."
It is ironic that the Court in Doe v. Pickett, 480 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D.W.Va. 1979),
refused to certify a class composed of all individuals under the age of 18 who seek family
planning services, in part on the grounds that the court "recognizes that members of a
class of minors of child bearing age vary in maturity and their ability to make informed
decisions."
59. See J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 30
(1980) ("Obviously all unequal treatment by the state cannot be forbidden. Legislation
characteristically classifies, distributing certain benefits to, or requiring certain behavior
of, some but not others. What's more, such classification typically proceeds on the basis
of generalizations that are known to be imperfect. We all order our lives on the basis of
such generalizations: without them life would be impossible"). See also Fiss, Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHn.. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
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volves a "fundamental right" or "suspect class" and, since contra-
ceptive use has been identified as one aspect of a fundamental
right,60 decisions concerning parental consent requirements for
contraceptive services are subject to this heightened or strict judicial
scrutiny. 6' While it is therefore unnecessary for the courts to con-
sider whether or not "youth" constitutes a suspect classification, 62
the heightened scrutiny caused the courts to query the appropriate-
ness of using age as a proxy for maturity. It was as a result of this
reasoning that the U.S. courts hinted at an attempt to ameliorate the
overinclusive effects of an age-based classification by using a judicial
bypass system like that developed for abortion decisions.
63
In England, the majority of the House of Lords also questioned
the validity of using age as a surrogate for maturity, concluding that
an age-based classification should be rejected or, at least, severely
curtailed on public policy grounds. 64 Lord Fraser, for example, ar-
gued that because of "the ordinary experience of mankind, at least
in Western Europe in the present century... the view that a child's
intellectual ability is irrelevant cannot now be accepted. ' 65
Although fully aware of the difficulties of determining maturity,66
the Lords rejected the Court of Appeal's argument that a fixed age
limit was justified by the public interest in the law being certain. 67
In the view of the majority, as stated by Lord Scarman:
[Certainty] brings with it an inflexibility and rigidity which in some
branches of the law can obstruct justice, impede the law's development
and stamp upon the law the mark of obsolescence... If the law should
60. See supra note 30.
61. In Danforth, the court held that since "the state has somewhat broader authority
to regulate the activities of children than of adults", there must be "a significant state
interest.., that is not present in the case of an adult" to justify the burdens imposed on
the minor. Danforth at 74-75. See also Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy: Limitations on State
Action After Danforth and Carey, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1216, 1232 n.88 (1977) [hereinafter
The Minor's Right of Privacy].
62. See Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications and Conclusive Presumptions: 3 Linked Rid-
dles, 39 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 35 (1975) (suggesting that childhood might be
treated as a "semi-suspect classification" and that "absent compelling justification, age-
based, and analogously semi-suspect, lines must be open to rebuttal in settings involving
both (1) the deprivation of liberties ordinarily deemed fundamental, and (2) the pres-
ence of moral transition - at least if coupled with a self-preserving institutional
unresponsiveness").
63. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
64. Gillick at 419.
65. Id. at 411.
66. The U.S. courts have also recognized these difficulties. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 643, n.23.
67. See also Samuels, Contraceptive Advice and Assistance to a Child Under 16, 22 MED. SCI.
AND LAW 215 (1983) (having an age of majority "is a clear, simple, practical rule, which
everybody knows and understands and can apply").
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impose on the process of 'growing up' fixed limits where nature knows
only a continuous process, the price would be artificiality and a lack of
realism in an area where the law must be sensitive to human develop-
ment and social change.
68
Lord Scarman added later in his judgment that "uncertainty is the
price which has to be paid to keep the law in line with social experi-
ence." 69 The other major argument against individualized determi-
nations considered by the Lords was that such determinations could
invite discrimination and other abuses of discretion and are costly in
terms of both time and money.7 0 The court, however, argued that
the better course was to regulate the use of discretion rather than to
adopt an age-based classification, 71 for, as Lord Scarman stated,
"any such general dividing line is sure to produce in some cases
injustice, hardship and injury to health,"' 72 which might outweigh
the danger of abuse of discretion. The Lords' final decision went
beyond that of their U.S. counterparts. Rather than initially assum-
ing the immaturity of all minors below a certain age, the Lords re-
quired an individualized determination of maturity in every case,
with decisionmaking authority vested in the doctor instead of the
courts.73
Although the recognition of the problems of a rigid age-based
classification is laudable, the courts in both countries have failed to
ensure the equal treatment of minors capable of making independ-
ent decisions by requiring proof of maturity before dispensing with
parental consent.74 Also the means of proving maturity remains
problematic because both judicial systems have allocated decision-
making responsibility without providing any real guidelines in lieu
of age for the determination of maturity. The U.S. courts have
merely equated maturity with ability to make an independent deci-
68. Gillick at 421.
69. Id. at 425. However, Lord Scarman did comment that it would be open to the
legislature to intervene in favor of certainty by laying down rigid demarcations after a
full consideration of all relevant factors. Id. at 421.
70. See, e.g., B. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAK-
ING 816 (1983); Wald, supra note 5, at 268 n.55.
71. Gillick at 413 (Fraser, L.J.) and 425 (Scarman, L.J.).
72. Id. at 425. See also M. FREEMAN, THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF CHILDREN (1983)
("the danger of discrimination by the decision maker should not lead to the elimination
of discretion but to its confinement and control against bias").
73. The House of Lords seems to assume the possibility of judicial review of the
doctor's discretion. See Gillick at 411 ("It is a question of fact for the judge (or jury) to
decide whether a particular child can give effective consent to contraceptive treatment").
74. Not only is it unreasonable to ask someone to go to court to prove his or her
ability to exercise a fundamental right, but in practice, poor, minority and rural minors
cannot take advantage of the option of going to court and are thus denied the opportu-
nity to prove their maturity. Donovan, supra note 37, at 267.
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sion.75 The Lords have been slightly more precise, emphasizing
that maturity also depends on the nature of the particular decision.
Lord Fraser stated his opinion that:
[P]rovided the patient . . .is capable of understanding what is pro-
posed, and of expressing his or her own wishes, I see no good reason
for holding that he or she lacks the capacity to express them validly
and effectively and to authorise the medical man to make the examina-
tion or give the treatment which he advises.76
Lord Scarman talks of the maturity requirement as being satisfied by
proof that the minor has a "sufficient understanding and intelli-
gence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed. ' 77
While these statements do serve to clarify what is meant by matur-
ity, they still leave the decisionmaker with very broad discretion,
and, although courts are often called upon to determine states of
mind without strict guidelines, U.S. studies of the operation of the
"judicial bypass" in abortion decisions have led most U.S. commen-
tators to conclude that "the real intent of such statutes is to make it
more difficult for minors to obtain abortions" rather than to provide
a means for minors to demonstrate their maturity.7 8 Furthermore,
the judicial bypass seems to have allotted to the courts an impossi-
ble task for, as Judge Martin of Duluth acknowledged, it is almost
absurd to expect a court to determine a minor's maturity in the
space of five minutes - the average duration of hearings before his
court. Indeed, the judicial bypass laws have unreasonably strained
already busy courts and have increased substantially the need for
public defenders and guardians ad litem. 79 The U.K. alternative of
requiring the doctor to determine the maturity of the minor seems
somewhat more reasonable because the minor already has to go to a
doctor for a prescription whereas the U.S. judicial bypass requires a
special appearance in court. Doctors are also accustomed to making
decisions which go beyond the strict limits of clinical judgment, and
are more likely than judges to be familiar with the level of under-
75. Bellotti at 643-44.
76. Gillick at 409-10. Lord Fraser also talks of the minor having "sufficient under-
standing and intelligence to know what [contraceptive advice, examination and treat-
ment] involve," but it is unlikely that the intelligence requirement adds anything to the
requirement of understanding.
77. Id at 422-23. This encompasses the nature of the advice being given and moral
and family questions. Id. at 424. Lord Scarman also mentions the requirement that the
minor be "capable of making up his or her own mind on the matter requiring decision"
and having "sufficient discretion to enable him or her to exercise a wise choice in his or
her own interests."
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standing required to make a decision about the use of contracep-
tives. The danger remains, however, that minors will be denied
contraceptives not because they are immature but as a result of doc-
tors' personal views of the propriety of minors using contraceptives.
In addition, the House of Lords' conditions require the doctor to be
satisfied that the provision of contraceptives is in the minor's best
interests and that her physical or mental health is likely to suffer
unless she receives contraceptive advice. The latter requirement is
an obstacle that adults do not have to surmount and, therefore,
places an unfair burden on minors whom the doctor has already de-
termined to be mature. Furthermore, the additional responsibility
may not be welcomed by the medical profession since it would leave
them open to malpractice suits and possibly even criminal actions.80
III. Beyond Rational Decisionmaking
Inasmuch as their decisions have focused on rational decision-
making and maturity, the courts in both countries have only
squarely addressed the issue of parental involvement in the deci-
sions of mature minors to obtain contraceptives. This leaves unan-
swered the more difficult question of what to do when the minor is
judged to be immature and is, therefore, not considered to be the
best judge of her own interests. An examination of the position of
such immature minors has led both the U.S. and the U.K. courts to
recognize that rational decisionmaking is not the only issue involved
in questions of minors' access to contraceptives.
One other policy goal supported by, for example, the Doe v. Irwin
plaintiffs in the U.S. and Mrs. Gillick in the U.K., is the preservation
of an independent fundamental right of parents to make decisions
on behalf of their minor children. The U.S. court acknowledged the
existence of this fundamental right but held that it was not constitu-
tionally violated by the absence of a parental consent requirement.si
80. This concern is probably not of great importance, however, because the discre-
tion the House of Lords advocates giving to the doctor would seem to be no greater
than for other medical decisions which have implications going beyond the physical
health of the patient. Furthermore, the doctor is highly unlikely to be found guilty of
encouraging unlawful sexual intercourse, or of being an accessory to such a crime, be-
cause the doctor's probable intention is to provide a palliative against the consequences
of the crime and it would be perverse to regard this action as criminal conduct. See
Gillick at 413-14 (Fraser, LJ.) and 424-25 (Scarman, L.J.).
81. The court's reasoning was that since visiting the birth control clinic was volun-
tary, the parents remained free to exercise their traditional care, custody and control
over their minor children and, thus, there was "no deprivation of the liberty interest of
parents in the practice of not notifying them of their children's voluntary decisions to
participate in the activities of the Center." Doe v. Irwin at 1168; PPAU v. Matheson at
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In the U.K., while the Court of Appeal accepted the contentions that
parents have a parcel of rights in relation to a child in their custody,
including the right to completely control the child, and that the par-
ents' decision would be treated as prima facie in the child's best in-
terests, the House of Lords made short shrift of these arguments.
The Lords instead endorsed Lord Denning's view in Hewer v. Bryant
that the legal right of the parent to the custody of a child "is a dwin-
dling right which the courts will hesitate to enforce against the
wishes of the child, the older he is. It starts with a right of control
and ends with little more than advice." 8 2 The Lords' view that pa-
rental rights should be seen as being for the protection of the imma-
ture minor and should cease as soon as the minor is deemed to be
mature enough to make independent decisions is clearly to be pre-
ferred. To find otherwise would be to equate the child with the
property of the parent, an attitude which, in the words of Lord Fra-
ser, should be relegated to the status of "a historical curiosity."
8 3
Even where the minor is immature, parents should not be given
complete control over the child, and the best interests of the minor
should be able to override any parental rights.
In addition, the U.S. courts and literature devote considerable at-
tention to the suggestion that there should be a parental consent
requirement, not because the parents will necessarily make a better
decision, but because the state has an interest in bolstering parental
authority for the sake of "the family" as an institution.8 4 A parental
consent requirement has been said to be in the best interests of the
family because it respects a private realm of family life which the
state should not enter;8 5 or because it enhances parental responsi-
bility for the protection of minors' interests;8 6 or because internal
.450-51 (the parents' interests are affected but they must give way to the constitutional
rights of mature minors or immature minors whose best interests are contrary to paren-
tal involvement).
82. Gillick at 412, quoting Hewer v. Bryant, [1969] 3 All E.R. 578, 582 (C.A.). Lord
Scarman also stated that "the principle of the law.., is that parental rights are derived
from parental duty and exist only so long as they are needed for the protection ... of the
child. Id. at 420.
83. Id.
84. Professor Wald argues that "[m]ost legal and social policy is based on the beliefs
that children lack the capacity to make decisions on their own and that parental control
of children is needed to support a stable family system, which is crucial to the well-being
of society." He also comments that "the reasons why our family structure is critical to
the well-being of the state are rarely articulated." Wald, supra note 5, at 259 n.17.
85. The plaintiffs in Doe v. Irwin advanced this argument, which was rejected by the
court. Irwin, 615 F.2d at 1167-68.
86. INST. OF JUD. ADMIN./AM. BAR ASS'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS
RELATING TO RIGHTS OF MINORS 52 (1980).
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decisionmaking promotes family stability and cohesiveness through
encouraging family discussion and contributing to the general
knowledge of the welfare of family members.8 7
Even assuming the value of the traditional family, the claim that
the state has an interest in strengthening the family is circular. It
ignores the fact that the family or private sphere is not a natural
social institution but one that is itself created by the state,88 and a
state decision not to regulate the activities of family members is nev-
ertheless a state action regarding the family and is not, therefore,
non-intrusive. 89 The other two claims are empirical and are equally
questionable because denying minors the right to make important
decisions could very well weaken the family unit.90 Furthermore,
studies show that forcing a minor to obtain parental consent does
not necessarily lead to family involvement and is likely to cause her
to have intercourse anyway but without using contraceptives. 9' It
has also been argued that rather than enhancing parental authority,
"if [the parents'] lack of control is such that intercourse is occurring,
it implies either that they are indifferent or that they regard the
practice as inevitable or that the situation is beyond their control." 92
Thus, considerations of the interests of the family as a unit, like con-
siderations of parental interests, are insufficient to provide a basis
for a veto over a minor's ability to receive contraceptive services
whether or not the minor is mature.
Another obvious and important policy objective, which both the
U.K. and U.S. courts have recognized, is the protection of the best
87. Id. See also Wald, supra note 5, at 280 ("Parents may not be able to perform
these roles [of providing help, guidance and support for the child] if they do not know
about critical events in the child's life").
88. See Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1497, 1504 passim (1983).
89. Minimum state interference only makes sense when the parent and child agree.
See Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L REV. 1156, 1219
n. 137 (1980) [hereinafter Developments]. Given the probable distribution of power in the
family, a decision in favor of family autonomy amounts to one in favor of parental au-
thority. See Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contracep-
tive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001, at 1013-15 (1974-75).
90. Developments, supra note 89, at 1220 n.144. A possible alternative would be to
encourage minors to bring in their parents voluntarily. See, e.g., Gillick at 413; Title X,
supra note 15.
91. See infra note 97; see also Lord Denning's rather incredible view, acknowledging
that a girl might be too afraid to ask for contraception if she believed that her parents
might be notified, but that it is more important that her relationship with her family is
maintained than that her pregnancy is prevented. Interview with London Weekend Tel-
evision, reported in The Guardian, Dec. 5, 1983, at 3, col. 5.
92. J. MASON & R. MCCALL SMITH, LAW. AND MEDICAL ETHICS 103 (1983).
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interests of the minor.9 3 It has been argued that a parental consent
requirement is in the minor's best interest because, it is claimed, the
unconditional supply of contraceptives to minors increases the level
of teenage sexual activity. This increase is itself said to be harmful
to the psychological and physical well-being of minors. 94 The argu-
ment continues that parents should be involved in the decisionmak-
ing process because they are best placed to enforce abstention.
Also, requiring their consent for the provision of contraceptives de-
lays the initiation of sexual intercourse because, rather than involve
their parents, minors will not attempt to obtain contraceptives and
will forego sexual activity in the face of the threat of pregnancy.
However, studies show that the lack of contraceptive protection is
not a significant deterrent against sexual intercourse; "[o]nly one in
seven teenagers who attend family planning clinics come for contra-
ceptive help before they initiate intercourse.- 95 Even if the threat of
pregnancy did deter minors from sexual activity, U.S. courts have
held that states still should not impose a parental consent require-
ment because it is plainly unreasonable to punish fornication with
93. The danger of a nurturance orientation, however, is that it may actually be a
means of maintaining the powerlessness of a group. See, e.g., Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 995 (1984), in relation to the position of women in
society. As to minors, because of the social construction of childhood, maturity is
mainly dependent on experience and practice. Therefore, making decisions on behalf of
an immature minor may retard the ability of that minor to act in a mature and responsi-
ble manner.
94. In part this claim relies on the fact that the legislatures in both countries have
seen fit to protect female minors by criminalizing sexual intercourse with all females
below the age of majority, or some fixed age below that, at least so far as the male
participant is concerned. See, e.g., Sexual Offences Act, 1956, ch. 69, §§ 5, 6; Lord Bran-
don's dissent in Gillick at 428-31; N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 263.00-263.25 (Consol. 1984 &
Supp. 1985). However, deference to the criminal laws would require that all minors be
denied access to contraceptives whether mature or not, and this conflicts with the courts'
position that mature minors should be treated as adults.
Not only is increased sexual activity said to be harmful but contraceptive use itself is
claimed to be detrimental to the physically immature. See Gillick at 434 (Templeman,
L.J., dissenting). However, studies show that "[tihe pill is no more risky in this age
group than any other contraceptive method and it affords sexually active teenagers the
best protection against the five times greater risks associated with pregnancy and child-
birth." 1:3 PUBLIC POL'Y ISSUES IN BRIEF 2 (1981). See also RISKING THE FUTURE, supra
note 6, at 161-62; BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL, REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE (Nov.
12, 1983).
95. ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, TEENAGE PREGNANCY: THE PROBLEM THAT HASN'T
GONE AWAY 44 (1981). See also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, at 695-
96, 702, 714-15; Developments, supra note 89, at 1372-73. This issue led to an interesting
pair of letters to The Times (London). The first, from Lord Devlin, said that "the com-
mon law may yet decide whether parents or health authorities are to decide whether to
provide those under 16 with the means of sexual promiscuity." In response, Professor
Simpson of the University of Kent wrote: "Nature provides the means, and the onset of
puberty the inclination" (July 29 and Aug. 1, 1983). See also Gillick at 430, 434 (Brandon
and Templeman, LL.J., dissenting).
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the possibility of pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child.9
The gravity of this possibility is demonstrated by other studies
showing that a parental consent requirement, while not causing mi-
nors to forego sexual activity, would deter them from seeking con-
traception and would thereby expose minors to the far greater
problems of teenage pregnancy. 97 One of the most important stud-
ies in support of this argument is a survey of teenage fertility in
thirty-seven developed countries, focusing particularly on the U.S.,
Canada, Britain, the Netherlands, France and Sweden, which was
published by the American Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI). Of the
countries surveyed, the U.S. and the Netherlands were found to
have the highest and lowest teenage pregnancy rates respectively,
with Britain falling somewhere in the middle. The researchers at-
tributed their findings in part to the lack of confidentiality for teen-
agers wanting contraceptives in the U.S. compared with Britain, the
Netherlands and Sweden, where contraceptive services appear to be
most accessible on a confidential basis to minors. 98 Services in the
Dutch clinics are entirely confidential if the minor so requests and,
at the time of the survey and prior to the Gillick case, complete confi-
dentiality was also the practice in Britain.
Other American studies provide similar evidence that increased
access to family planning services reduces the rate of unwanted
pregnancy. A study of combined education and family planning
services in junior and senior high schools in St. Paul, Minnesota,
showed that these programs decreased the rate of unwanted preg-
96. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 at 715-16 ("It is as though a
State decided to dramatize its disapproval of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety
helmets") (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448
(1972); Developments, supra note 89, at 1373; The Minor's Right to Privacy, supra note 61, at
1232-33. If deterrence is the better solution, it would be more appropriate to focus on
criminalizing such behavior.
97. "Approximately 1/4 of young teenage patients would not attend family planning
clinics if their parents had to be informed. Only 2% of those would forego sexual activity
.... PPACT INC., FACTSHEET 2 (Jan. 1985). See also RISKING THE FUTURE, supra note 6,
at 159; Gillick at 412.
98. Jones, Forrest, Goldman, Henshaw, Lincoln, Rosott, Westoff & Wulf, supra note
9, at 57-58. It should be noted that the figures for contraceptive use in the U.K., Nether-
lands and U.S. were for 1976 (used currently), 1981 (used at last coitus) and 1979 (used
at last coitus) respectively, and only covered never-married women. The results were
interestingly not correlated with the levels of adolescent sexual activity. Id. at 60. Other
factors considered were the extent of public health and welfare benefit systems; income
distribution; size of the country; homogeneity of the population; influence of conserva-
tive religious bodies; school sex education; age of initiation of sexual activity; and cost of
contraceptive services. Id.
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nancy by 56 percent in one school and 23 percent in two others. 99
Another study reported that during the 1970s "2.6 million unin-
tended adolescent pregnancies were averted" by federally funded
family planning programs, with roughly 417,000 of these in 1979
alone.' 00
Unwanted pregnancy is acknowledged to be a serious problem for
both the mother and her child.' 0 ' A 1985 U.S. House of Represent-
atives Select Committee Report found that "teens have higher risk
factors for low birthweight infants, infant mortality, inadequate or
no prenatal care, school incompletion, economic self-sufficiency,
and having less healthy children."' 1 2 Maternal morbidity and mor-
tality are also considerably greater for teenage mothers. 0 3 Teen
parents furthermore suffer higher rates of marital instability, 10 4 and
their children are more likely than other children to become teen
parents themselves.
In their decisions concerning minors' access to contraceptives, the
U.S. and U.K. courts have failed to take account of the evidence that
a restrictive attitude to the access of immature minors to contracep-
tives will not control sexual activity but will increase the incidence of
unintended teenage pregnancy. This evidence suggests that a pa-
rental consent requirement is not in the best interests of even imma-
ture minors. The courts should recognize that although a decision
99. Edwards, Steinman, Arnold & Hakanson, Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention Services in
High School Clinics, 12 FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 6-14 (1980).
100. Forrest, Hermalin & Henshaw, The Impact of Family Planning Clinic Programs on
Adolescent Pregnancy, 13 FAMILY PLANNING PERSP. 109-16 (1981). See also Zabin, The Impact
of Early Use of Prescription Contraceptives on Reducing Premarital Teenage Pregnancies, 13 FAMILY
PLANNING PERSP. 72-74 (1981); J.E. ALLEN & D. BENDER, MANAGING TEENAGE PREG-
NANCY: ACCESS TO ABORTION, CONTRACEPTION AND SEX EDUCATION (1980).
The effect of contraceptive use on pregnancy rates was also recognised by Lord Jus-
tice Bridge: "contraception may be the only effective means of avoiding a wholly unde-
sirable pregnancy." Gillick at 428.
101. See Committee Report on Teen Pregnancy, supra note 10, at ix: "Regardless of one's
political philosophy, the prospect of one million teenage pregnancies, 400,000 abor-
tions, and one-half million births each year, nearly fifty-five percent of which vill be
births to unmarried teens, is chilling. The human and fiscal costs to all are unaccept-
able." Not all teenage pregnancies, however, are unintended. A 1979 U.S. study, for
example, reported that 18% of metropolitan-area teenagers who had become
premaritally pregnant wanted to become pregnant. Zelnick & Kanter, Sexual Activity,
Contraceptive Use and Pregnancy Among Metropolitan Teenagers: 1971-1979, 12 FAMILY PLAN-
NING PERSP. 230-37 (1980).
102. Id. at 1. See also ALAN GUTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 95, at 28 (1981) (the
"most far reaching consequence of teenage childbearing is the truncation of education
among the young parents" which, along with the tendency of teenage mothers to be
single parents, generally leads to the child being brought up in a low income
household).
103. ALAN Gu-rMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 95, at 29.
104. Committee Report on Teen Pregnancy, supra note 10, at 16.
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to let minors use contraceptives is obviously about enabling them to
engage in sexual intercourse without the danger of getting preg-
nant, the stress should not be on "enabling sexual intercourse" but
on "without getting pregnant." 0 5 Therefore the courts should en-
sure the access of all minors to contraceptives.
IV. Conclusion
The U.S. and U.K. legislatures and judiciaries should turn their
energies to addressing the very real problem of teenage pregnancy.
The courts should take into consideration the social, economic and
health consequences of unintended teenage pregnancy rather than
basing their decisions exclusively or primarily on considerations of
individual maturity.' 0 6 Since an increase in the use of contracep-
tives can reduce the rate of unintended teenage pregnancy, any mi-
nor who seeks contraceptive services should be given them without
parental involvement. 10 7 Such an approach would be well within
the bounds of the judicial role. The U.S. courts have already recog-
nized that the state's interests may be factored into the constitu-
tional balance and the Supreme Court has ruled that a state has "an
independent interest in the well-being of its youth."' 08 The U.K.
courts have explicitly based the Gillick decision on public policy, and
there are very good arguments for making the goal of pregnancy
prevention a major policy concern. A consideration of unintended
teenage pregnancy would not conflict with issues of self-determina-
tion or of the best interests of the minor. It would also reintroduce
the certainty sacrificed by the courts' attempts to avoid the inequi-
ties of age-based determinations, while providing an approach con-
sistent with the goal of equal treatment in the absence of any
105. See Gillick at 428-31 (Brandon, L.J., dissenting).
106. Even if the state's overriding interest was in ensuring that minors make well-
reasoned childbearing decisions, this argues for making a more extensive educational
effort rather than attempting to relieve minors of the opportunity to make the decision.
See supra note 93 and The Minor's Right to Privacy, supra note 61, at 1255.
107. This is the solution recommended by the Institute of Judicial Administration
and the American Bar Association. See INST. JUD. ADMIN./AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 86,
at 72. There are other scholars who argue that immature minors should have the free-
dom to make their own choices purely out of self-determination concerns. See, e.g., J.
HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 18 (1974); R. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 27 (1974).
108. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968). There is also a precedent for
ignoring issues of actual or presumed maturity in state statutes permitting treatment for
venereal disease and chemical dependency, e.g. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-4 (venereal dis-
ease); ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 22 § 104(17) (drug and alcohol dependency).
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compelling justification for impinging upon the freedom of choice
of minors. ' 0 9
109. These conclusions have broad implications for the position of minors in soci-
ety. It would be necessary for policymakers to reassess other instances where minors are
treated differently from adults on the basis of their chronological age, where age is used
as a surrogate for maturity. Indeed, Lord Fraser used the equal ability of minors regard-
less of maturity in other areas to support his conclusion regarding contraception. Gillich
at 409. On the one hand, the fundamental nature of decisions concerning contraception
justifies special respect for minors' rights in this area; but, on the other hand, the ability
of minors to make decisions to which serious consequences attach argues for greater
latitude in less serious matters.
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